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ABSTRACT. Paying thorough attention to cynical action and integrity could result
in a less naive approach to ethics and moral communication. This article discusses
the issues of integrity and cynicism on a theoretical and on a more practical level.
The ﬁrst part confronts Habermass approach of communicative action with Slot-
erdijks concept of cynical reason. In the second part, the focus will be on the
constraints and possibilities of moral communication within a business context.
Discussing the corporate integrity approach of Kaptein and Wempe will provide this
focus. Their approach can be considered as a valuable contribution to the question of
how to deal with (dilemmas of) conﬂicting interests, open discussion, fairness, and
strategic decision-making in the context of stakeholder dialog. However, it is con-
cluded that Kaptein and Wempe seem to overstretch the concept of corporate
integrity by their inclination to make it an all-purpose remedy for corporate
dilemmas.
KEY WORDS: Business ethics, communicative/strategic action, cynicism, integrity,
moral communication, open/hidden agendas, social theory
1. INTRODUCTION
Moral communication in the context of free market competition is often
called into question. A genuine discussion about morality and ethics seems
diﬃcult if not impossible to realize in such a context. One could argue that
the economic interests at stake in the market conﬂict with the ethical pre-
requisite of non-strategic communication, which is characterized by open
moral discussion and sincere involvement of the participants. Therefore,
corporations are not in a position to freely deliberate about moral issues. A
cynic might add that moral statements of corporations are merely window-
dressing. According to Kaptein and Wempe the term integrity has become
increasingly used within the business context since the mid-1990s (2002:
152). Could it be that integrity has become a true concern among many
business organizations? Or is this occupation with integrity mainly business,
a cunning response of proﬁt seeking enterprises to consumer needs for
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‘‘honest’’ economic islands in a world increasingly featured by globalization,
drifting values, and changing identities?
Integrity is a complicated matter, not only in the domain of free market
competition but also in the political and public domain. Strategic action and
the use of hidden agendas seem to be phenomena that are widely recognized
by citizens of modern societies. As a consequence, ambitious plans or pro-
jects featured by ‘‘high’’ values or ideals are often distrusted. Within the
domain of agricultural production, we can think of the development of ever
higher food safety standards in the European Union. Political institutions or
involved economic enterprises allege that these standards are primarily
motivated by the wish to deal with consumer concerns in a responsible
manner. But are these motivations not just obscuring certain hidden agen-
das of economic interests that are at work behind the scenes, for instance the
protection of national markets against cheaper food products from devel-
oping countries that cannot meet the requirements of these higher stan-
dards? The same skepticism could arise with respect to the introduction of
quality standards regarding animal welfare or sustainability, which are often
said to be in the interest of the consumer. Should these standards not also
be seen in the perspective of protecting market positions for opportunist
reasons?
Sloterdijk relates cynicism about high ideals or economic or political
blueprints to the critical tradition of Enlightenment to debunk concealed
motives and hidden interests (Sloterdijk, 1983). The often cynical response
of modern citizens towards the ‘‘social missions’’ of politicians, nation
states, or powerful, international corporations could be seen as the dark side
of ‘‘reﬂexive modernization’’ (Beck et al., 2000). According to Sloterdijk,
cynical distrust in idealistic intentions and rational reasoning are closely
connected. Following this vision, the problem of integrity should be re-
garded as a fundamental issue concerning the possibilities and constraints of
moral communication between rational agents. This article focuses on this
key issue of integrity in moral communication. The following questions will
be addressed:
• Is the presupposition of non-strategic communication and integrity,
which is thought to be necessary for moral communication, a realistic
assumption?
• Is most if not all moral communication in societal practice not cursed
with power struggles and strategies?
• Is moral communication possible in an economic market context
despite the constraints and dilemmas of corporations?
• Could the problem of integrity, cynicism, and hidden agendas be
solved by the development and improvement of corporate integrity?
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The ﬁrst two questions will be discussed by confronting Habermass ap-
proach of communicative action (1981) with Peter Sloterdijks concept of
cynical reason (1983). I will argue that Habermass theory suﬀers from
empirical demarcation problems and also seems to underestimate the impact
of modern cynicism in moral communication.
The last two questions, which address the issue of moral communication,
integrity, and cynicism on a more practical level, will be dealt with by
discussing the corporate integrity model of Kaptein and Wempe (2002).
Finally, I will consider whether this latter model oﬀers a fruitful perspective
to tackle cynicism in a market context.
2. MORAL COMMUNICATION, INTEGRITY, AND CYNICISM
2.1. Characteristics of Moral Communication
Moral communication is communicating or discussing the contents of moral
pronouncements. It should be understand as an exchange of moral beliefs
and convictions. A crucial assumption is also that one aims to understand
the perspective of the other person or party. Moral pronouncements are
normative judgments, featured by appeals to general consent (in this regard
they diﬀer from expressions of taste). Furthermore, they evoke feelings of
shame and pride, concern both actions and attitudes, and involve issues
where fundamental (personal) interests are at stake (Kaptein and Wempe,
2002: 40–42). Although the reasons for engaging in moral communication
can be strategic, e.g., image-building, such strategic reasons cannot be used
as legitimate arguments in a moral discussion. The (lack of) openness about
the ‘real reasons for engaging in moral communication is often related to
the degree of integrity of the disputing parties.
2.2. The Multi-layered Concept of Integrity
The etymological roots of integrity can be found in the Latin word integritas
meaning ‘‘wholeness,’’ ‘‘completeness,’’ and ‘‘purity.’’ The ethical concept of
integrity has many layers and is diﬃcult to deﬁne. Cox et al. (2005) distinguish
ﬁve diﬀerent accounts of integrity: (i) integrity as the integration of the self;
(ii) integrity as maintenance of identity-conferring commitments; (iii) integrity
as standing for something; (iv) integrity as moral purpose; and (v) integrity as
a virtue. In common with Cox et al. (2005) I will take integrity to be a
complex and thick term, a cluster concept under which diﬀerent overlapping
qualities of character are tied together. Integrity is not so much a ﬁxed
property of a person but rather a quality of many actions that may point to a
personality with integrity. It concerns the motives behind the action and
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presumes a unity of eﬀort. Integrity can be improved and should not be seen
as a natural thing that a person does or does not have (Wempe, 1998: 180).
The theoretical and philosophical debate concerning integrity often
focuses on the implications that integrity has for individual persons. My
focus in this article will not be on the personal implications of integrity or
the (complex) relation between personal integrity and moral principles, but
on integrity as ‘‘standing for something’’ in the context of moral commu-
nication. The point of departure is agents engaged in social discussions
about moral issues that are considered to be of substantial societal impor-
tance. Moral integrity in this sense presumes that one has a moral ‘‘core’’: a
set of recognizable principles or commitments that gives an actor (person,
party, organization) character or identity. The existence of this moral core is
also the reason that a loss of integrity is a real possibility. McFall (1987: 10)
expresses this succinctly: ‘‘In order to sell ones soul, one must have some-
thing to sell.’’
Calhoun (1995) argues that integrity clearly is a virtue but that it is not
always properly understood as a social virtue, as standing for something. In
her view, integrity becomes meaningful only when personal judgments about
moral issues are publicly deliberated with other people. Integrity is not only
an expression of a personal virtue, standing up for values that constitute
who one is, but also of community involvement. In short, integrity is
strongly connected with responsible citizenship. This social understanding
of integrity also shifts our sense of what might be the obstacles to integrity.
Besides the awareness of intra-personal obstacles, e.g., self-deception,
weakness of will, or ambivalence about ones endorsements, one should also
have an open eye for public obstacles like contempt of the public, loss of job,
penal sanctions, being labeled ‘‘confrontational’’ or ‘‘diﬃcult,’’and so on.
‘‘Even the thickest skinned and toughest willed may ﬁnd them hard to stand
up against, especially on a continuing basis.’’ (Calhoun, 1995: 259) The
relation of integrity with social and political conditions also leads us to the
tension between ideal and reality, between the world as how it ought to be
and the world as it is. This tension seems to be of great importance for the
chances of integrity. The more people lose faith in the (positive) eﬀect and
meaning of moral behavior and become entrenched with views of a hopeless
power-driven world, the more intense the integrity question becomes. In
these conditions, people can react cynically, seek their refuge in expedient
action, and become indiﬀerent to the call for moral integrity.
2.3. Cynicism: Hidden Agendas at Work
The Oxford English Dictionary (Volume II) deﬁnes a cynical person as a
sneering fault-ﬁnder; as somebody showing a disposition to disbelieve in the
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sincerity or goodness of human motives and actions, and is wont to express
this by sneers and sarcasms. However, in order to get an adequate under-
standing of cynicism in modern societies, this description is incomplete and
could even be misleading. According to Sloterdijk (1983) and Goldfarb
(1991), cynicism has become ubiquitous and comes with discretion and
resignation nowadays. Citizens of modern societies are familiar with ratio-
nalizing strategic behavior in which a certain amount of immorality can be
observed, and everyone is also a little bit worried about this. This makes
cynicism also hard to challenge. The modern cynic has made himself im-
mune to rational criticism. He is aware of morally ‘‘correct’’ behavior but
still acts morally ‘‘wrong.’’ Moreover, he is able to defend his morally
‘‘incorrect’’ action in a rational way. ‘‘If I will not do this, somebody else
will — and probably worse.’’ Sloterdijk characterizes the cynical reason of
our modern age as ‘‘the enlightened wrong consciousness’’ (1983: 37). Cyni-
cism rests on the belief that ‘‘reality is hard’’ and that one has to consider all
realistic means that are available to pursue a private goal. Therefore, cyn-
icism could be deﬁned as all ‘‘morally incorrect’’ orientations, attitudes, and
actions that are (implicitly or explicitly) justiﬁed by referring to the way
things work in (hard) reality (De Bakker, 2001: 48).1
A popular example of cynicism in modern societies is the simpliﬁed
image of the power-mad politician or the calculating citizen without any
scruples about bending the rules of law in their own interest. Nevertheless,
such simplistic stereotypes do reveal an essential feature of cynical action:
the use of hidden agendas combined with a world view (Weltanschauung)
within which self-interest is considered as the driving force that makes the
world go round. The existence of open and hidden agendas is a useful
criterion to classify diﬀerent modes of social action (Table 1). It elucidates
that cynicism can be deployed both in a strategic and in a deliberative
context, and that expectations with respect to integrity play a key role in
social interaction.
Table 1 illustrates that hidden agendas are always connected with stra-
tegic action, but strategic action does not necessarily imply the use of hidden
agendas. Social agents can be straightforward about their strategic motives
and action goals, for instance corporations being fair rivals in a free market
1 The concept of cynism, as described by Sloterdijk, points out negative aspects of realistic
action on a rational basis. This might evoke the feeling that realistic action on a rational basis
can never be positive. For the sake of completeness, it should be mentioned that Sloterdijk
distinguishes between cynicism and kynicism. Kynicism is a confronting modus of rational-
realistic behavior. Its prototype is the Greek philosopher Diogenes in classical Athens, who was
famous for his unconcealed cynical statements and his provocations towards the rulers on top,
blueprints of a purely rationalist nature or the uncritical behavior of the masses in general. A
more detailed treatment of kynicism is beyond the scope of this article, which focuses on the
importance of recognizing cynical action and attitudes in the context of moral communication.
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competition. Cynical actions in a strategic context relate to concealed
strategies that violate the general rules and expectations in this context. An
example, would be a catering ﬁrm engaged in a tender for the provision of
meals to schools or prisons that gains advantage by bribing oﬃcials with
decisive power. When the other corporations do not employ such means,
one can speak of unilateral cynical action. In the case that other catering
ﬁrms try to do the same, one can speak of mutual cynical action.
Unilateral or mutual cynical action can also take place in a deliber-
ative context of moral discussions. An example of this type of action
would be a multinational corporation that secretly dumps its toxic waste
in developing countries and simultaneously takes a responsible stance in
moral discussions (in its home country) concerning sustainable produc-
tion methods to divert attention from its oversees environmental mis-
behavior. In a deliberative context, participants claim that their primary
concern is to reach reasonable agreement on the basis of common
interests. Because of the expectations that this arouses with respect to the
integrity of the participating actors, the dismay and anger of people
discovering unilateral cynical action is usually more intense in the
(deliberative) context of moral discussions than in a clearly strategic
context. If ‘‘victims of cynicism’’ lose all faith that criticism and rational
reasoning are able to stop the cynical use of hidden agendas on the other
side, it could even lead to mutual cynical action: actors at both sides
keeping up appearances about their moral integrity, while behind the
scenes all kind of hidden strategic maneuvers are taking place.
Table 1. Open and hidden agendas in connection with cynical action orienta-
tions.
Action
orientations
Open agendas Hidden agendas
At one side At all sides At one side At all sides
Strategic context
in which own
interests dominate
Unilateral
strategic
action
Mutual strategic
action
Unilateral
cynical
action
Mutual
cynical
action
Deliberative
context aimed
at persuasion and
intersubjective
agreement
Unilateral
persuasive
action
Mutual persuasive
action
Source: De Bakker (2001: 50).
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3. CONSONANT AND AMBIVALENT VIEWS ON RATIONALITY
3.1. Distinct Trajectories of Critical Thinking
The rational occupation with integrity and moral autonomy seems to suﬀer
deeply from the tension between ideal and reality. According to Owen, this
tension can also be observed in Kants famous essay ‘‘What is Enlighten-
ment?’’ (1784). In this essay, he recognizes that ‘‘mans emergence from his
self-imposed immaturity [unmu¨ndigkeit]’’ (quoted in Owen, 1998: 7) is re-
lated to socio-political conditions. Kant explains that one should strive for
maturity but also should keep in mind that the ideal age of complete
enlightenment (‘‘the Kingdom of Ends’’) still has to come. Living in Prussia
under Frederick II, he even warns for overstretching the civil liberties of-
fered by this age. So, Kant himself realized that at all times acting in
accordance with the categorical imperative2 does not guarantee positive
results in actual reality and can lead to personal disadvantage. This raises
the problem of why one should stick ones neck out following this moral
principle: why not wisely wait until the Kingdom of Ends has come? Owen
argues that Kants answer to this question, having faith and relying on the
existence of God, remains ungrounded. He also emphasizes the point that
post-Kantian social and political thought about maturity and moral
autonomy has been deeply inﬂuenced by this problem and that this resulted
in diﬀerent views on rationality (Owen, 1998: 1–14). We could say that while
Sloterdijk holds an ambivalent view on the rational sources of Enlighten-
ment, Habermass view on rationality is marked by consonance.
Owen believes that Habermass aversion to scholars such as Nietzsche,
Weber, and Foucault can be countered by pointing at an alternative tradi-
tion of post-Kantian critique that is diﬀerent from the Hegelian tradition
within which Habermas situates himself and which is featured by the per-
spective of self-actualization, the realization of ones authentic being as an
ethical agent. This alternative tradition is characterized by an ambivalent
view on rationality and modernity in which reason and power are deeply
interrelated. Habermas is aware of all the social problems of our modern
age, but warns that one should never overlook the unifying force of ratio-
nality, which, in the end, is the only force that can provide reasonable
reconciliation and social integration. By doing this, one makes the mistake
of ‘‘unwitting complicity with the capitulation of rationality to irrationality,
of thought to power, of right to might, which characterizes neo-conservative
politics.’’ (Owen, 1998: 2) However, Owen positions the historical reﬂections
of Nietzsche, Weber, and Foucault on the possibility of maturity and moral
2 ‘Act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature.
(Quoted in Kaptein and Wempe, 2002: 67.)
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autonomy in the understanding that modernity both creates and undercuts
the possibility of maturity, and that critical awareness and examination of
this ambivalence is the only way to confront and transcend this two-faced
nature of Enlightenment (Owen, 1998: 2–3). The tension between maturity
(achieving moral autonomy) and modern rational development should be
thoroughly analyzed, also when this implies that we will have to give up the
Habermasian idea of a possible ‘‘round and sound’’ reconciliation in the
end. This is the only sound way to deal with the (perhaps everlasting) ten-
sion between ideal and reality. The question remains which account of
rationality is most suitable for dealing with the issue of integrity in moral
communication.
3.2. Habermass Theory of Communicative Action
Habermas has developed a philosophical and sociological account of the
prerequisites for moral communication on a rational basis. An important
component of his theory of communicative action (Habermas, 1981) is the
distinction between communicative integration at the level of the lifeworld
and functional integration as brought about by economic and political sub-
systems that are steered through money and power. These diﬀerent levels of
social integration are featured by diﬀerent modes of social action. While
social coordination in the lifeworld is structured by processes of communi-
cation that aim at reaching agreement about validity claims, social coordi-
nation in the semi-independent subsystems of economic markets and
bureaucratic administrations rests on the strategic pursuit of private interests.
According to Habermas, the ultimate basis of social integration should be
sought in communicative action in which the participants ‘‘tie their agreement
to the intersubjective recognition of criticisable validity claims.’’ (Habermas,
1996: 4) This cannot be done in the economic and political subsystems of
capitalist markets and bureaucratic administrations, which are dominated by
purposive rational action and the strategic pursuit of personal advantages.
In Habermass view, moral communication on a reasonable basis is only
possible under the conditions of communicative rationality that characterize
the lifeworld. These conditions ensure that validity claims about (i) truth
(facts), and (ii) normative rightness or truthfulness (integrity, authenticity)
can be discussed freely. This lifeworld should not be seen as an association
within which individuals band together but as ‘‘constituted from a network
of communicative actions that branch out through social space and his-
torical time’’ (Habermas, 1996: 80). However, according to Habermas, the
lifeworld has been colonized to a certain extent by the economic and
political subsystems. This colonization threatens social integration in
modern societies.
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Although Habermas provides us with an insightful understanding of the
diﬀerent goals and claims connected with communicative and strategic
rationality, his dualism between the lifeworld and economic and political
subsystems is problematic. In many cases, it is simply not possible to draw a
clear-cut line between a communicative lifeworld and subsystems dominated
by strategic action. This can be illustrated by the practice of corporate social
responsibility (CSR). The mixture of economic motivations and communi-
cative eﬀorts makes it diﬃcult to tell whether CSR should be judged as
strategic, communicative, or otherwise. Habermass distinction between two
diﬀerent levels of social integration (lifeworld and semi-independent sub-
systems) seems insuﬃcient to clarify the complex manner in which society,
politics, and business are often entangled.
A second objection that could be raised against Habermas concerns his
presupposition of free discourse that ideally underlies communicative rea-
son. This leads inter alia to the assumption of communicatively acting
agents that ‘‘are accountable, that is, autonomous and sincere with both
themselves and others’’ (Habermas, 1996: 4). Agents wanting to reach rea-
sonable agreement have to adopt certain idealizations about the autonomy
and integrity of other participants. Habermas admits that a real moral
discourse often will not meet the requirements of fully free communication,
but contends that the underlying idealizations will always function as a
powerful source for raising communicative rationality, which, in the end, is
the only rational perspective for pushing back the distorting inﬂuence of
economic and political subsystems.
The presupposition of (relatively) free discourse, which also implies the
assumption of integrity, is probably one of the most diﬃcult problems in
the work of Habermas. What if integrity is not around or has thrown in
the towel? The theory of communicative action tries to solve the tension
between ideal and reality by taking the social structures of language itself as
starting point. Habermas argues that these structures show that, eventually,
the illocutionary binding forces of speech acts are always grounded on
voluntary agreement with the utterances and claims of other agents.
Therefore, the social practice of language itself can be our guide to maturity
and achieving moral autonomy.
3.3. Habermas versus Sloterdijk: Consonance versus Ambivalence
Although Habermas is aware of the possibility that actors can also act
strategically in a communicative context, he tends to downplay the impact
of modern cynicism. Cynical attitudes towards universalizable moral norms,
as being something that others may buy into but that need not aﬀect oneself,
are depicted and explained as ‘‘immature’’ orientations (Habermas, 1991:
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123 ﬀ.). Referring to Kohlbergs stages of moral judgment and Selmans
stages of perspective taking, deceiving other people would be an egocentric
action orientation, typical of preconventional or conventional orientations
that fail to grasp the more mature (postconventional) procedures for justi-
fying norms. In particular, adolescents who are in the transition to the
postconventional mode of thought could ﬁnd themselves trapped in skep-
ticism that blocks ‘‘the coordination of the success-oriented attitude of the
subject who acts strategically with the attitude oriented toward reaching
understanding of the person who continues to communicate through
argument.’’ (Habermas, 1991: 185–186). In other words, cynicism would be
characteristic for people going through their adolescence in a mistaken
way.3
However, one could question whether Habermass classiﬁcation of cyn-
icism as a nihilistic and immature response to the world does justice to
Sloterdijks treatment of this phenomenon. As explained before, Sloterdijk
analyzes the rise of cynicism in modern, postconventional cultures, which in
a rational sense seem to have reached maturity. This is precisely the prob-
lem: modern cynicism is not something that is caused by a lack of rational or
moral development but seems inherent to this development. Many citizens
in modern societies are enlightened and have emerged from self-imposed
immaturity, but this also seems to be a fruitful ground for becoming cynical.
This ambivalence of reason and rationality is exactly the concern of Slot-
erdijk. It also raises the question of whether Habermas takes the ambivalent
eﬀects of rationality serious enough in his discourse ethics, particularly
regarding his presupposition of a relatively free discourse in a communi-
cative domain occupied by authentic and reasonable agents. This question
will become urgent, if we recall the empirical demarcation problems with
respect to his concepts of the lifeworld and political and economic subsys-
tems. If one wishes to have an open eye for the cynical use of hidden agendas
in moral communication, it would seem more fruitful to take a hybrid social
reality as starting point in which strategic and communicative interactions
are inextricably intertwined. In other words, every moral discourse had
better be seen as cursed with power-struggles and strategies.
Taking Owens perspective of the two distinct trajectories of critical
thinking within modern thought, Sloterdijks Critique of Cynical Reason can
be seen as an insightful contribution to a less naı¨ve philosophy that is aware
of concealed power struggles and strategies. However, written as an exten-
sive cultural critique, it does not oﬀer much guidance on how to deal with
3 Remarkably, a similar line of reasoning can be found in Habermass review of Sloterdijks
Critique of Cynical Reason. Allthough Habermas considers this to be a nicely written essay
about cynicism and cultural disillusion, he also suggests that the author seems stuck in the
youthful experience of lost ideals (Habermas, 1985: 121–122).
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integrity on a more practical level of moral communication. In the next
sections, I will look at the concept of corporate integrity of Kaptein and
Wempe and show how this approach relates to Sloterdijk and Habermas.
Their approach to integrity in the ﬁeld of business ethics is more practical
and also interesting because it deals with moral communication in the do-
main of free market competition. In other words, the corporate integrity
model does not only embody a very practical ethics but also puts the idea of
integrity to the test in a social environment that is often regarded as unﬁt or
less favorable for moral deliberation.
4. THE CONCEPT OF CORPORATE INTEGRITY
4.1. Integrity as ‘‘Wholeness’’ and the Corporation as a Moral Entity
Kaptein and Wempe (2002: 80–86) state that the multi-layered concept of
integrity makes it well suited to integrate the main competing ethical ap-
proaches (virtue ethics, deontological ethics, and conseqentialist ethics).
Inspired by the Latin word integritas, which means ‘‘wholeness,’’ ‘‘com-
pleteness,’’ and ‘‘purity,’’ they deﬁne integrity by the following three char-
acteristics (Kaptein and Wempe, 2002: 90–93):
1. A person of integrity is an autonomous thinker; he or she has a stable set
of values and norms, and what he or she promotes is authentic; he or she
stands and strives for something and is true to his or her ideals.
2. A state of internal integration; a person of integrity is capable of inte-
grating his or her values, deeds, and their eﬀects in his or her life in a
natural way.
3. A state of external integration: a person of integrity is integrated into his
or her environment and sensitive to social issues, and willing to account
for himself or herself.
Integrity requires that one strives after wholeness or consistency in these
three areas. However, the above description of the characteristics also points
at a fundamental issue within business ethics: most models of ethics are
oriented towards moral choices that have to be made by individuals, but is it
also possible to hold an organization responsible in speciﬁc situations? In a
reductionist model of business ethics, corporate responsibility is reduced to
the sum of individual actions; the corporation only bears responsibility to
the extent to which individuals within the organization can be traced back as
responsible. Therefore, the corporation itself cannot be held responsible for
immoral action. Wempe and Kaptein take an opposite point of view (the
autonomy model) and consider the corporation as an autonomous moral
entity (Kaptein and Wempe, 2002: 145–152). They argue that within each
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corporation, an organizational structure and culture exists that can be dis-
tinguished from the individuals working within the corporation. The orga-
nizational structure concerns the tasks and responsibilities that are formally
given to the various positions and the hierarchical relations between these
positions. The organizational culture includes the informal structures within
an organization: the ideas, expectations, habits, and ways of thinking,
feeling, and doing that are speciﬁc to the corporation. Because of the
identiﬁable culture and structure underlying corporate practices, it is pos-
sible to see a corporation as a moral subject and to judge its actions and
intentions in moral terms.
4.2. Three Dilemmas that Challenge Corporate Integrity
Corporate integrity relates to the corporate eﬀorts that are localized in the
corporate culture and structure and refers to the coherence between cor-
porate eﬀorts, conduct, and consequences (Kaptein and Wempe, 2002: 152–
154). Just like a person of integrity, a corporation of integrity has to strive
for wholeness or consistency between (1) diﬀerent values, norms, and ideals
that motivate action; (2) words and deeds; and (3) corporate practices and
the outside world (societal expectations and demands). However, the pursuit
of corporate integrity is hindered or complicated by three dilemmas:
• The entangled hands dilemma refers to diﬀerent roles that employees
in a corporation may have to handle. These diﬀerent roles may be
badly coordinated and this can damage the corporation. Examples of
the entangled hands dilemma are improper use of corporate assets,
personal acceptance of promotional gifts, engaging in business with
family members, making private purchases from the corporations
suppliers.
• The many hands dilemma is visible in the relations that employees
within the corporation maintain in order to fulﬁll the responsibilities
of the corporation. The many hands dilemma points at the problem
that the internal specialization and division of labor, which character-
ize modern corporations, often leads to the dilution of responsibility.
• The dirty hands dilemma is visible in the relations maintained with the
various stakeholders on behalf of the corporation and refers to the
contradiction of interests and expectations. Corporations can be
pushed by stakeholders to take part in discussions on moral issues.
The interests and demands of less inﬂuential secondary stakeholders
(for example, speciﬁc interest groups, moral claimants in the media)
on a corporation may contradict the needs and expectations of pri-
mary stakeholder groups (for instance, shareholders, investors,
employees). It is also possible that the self-interest and the survival of
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the corporation are at odds with the demands and needs of other in-
volved parties. In the process of balancing the diﬀerent interests and
expectations, it is almost impossible for the corporation to avoid
dirty hands.
Within the scope of this article, the many hands dilemma seems especially
signiﬁcant, because this dilemma concerns the constraints of moral com-
munication with external stakeholders and the possibility of conﬂicting
interests and incompatible demands. In the view of Kaptein and Wempe,
dirty hands are often inevitable but can be made in a responsible way, if the
corporation reﬂects on its wider social obligations towards stakeholders. A
corporation should consider itself as a focal point within a network of
contractual relations. As an example of a successful answer to a dirty hands
dilemma, Kaptein and Wempe discuss the case of Avebe, the Dutch coop-
erative potato company that was on the brink of closing down in the 1980s
(2002: 217–222). For a long time, Avebe seemed not able to ﬁnd a realistic
and acceptable solution for the environmental pollution caused by the
wastewater produced by the processing of potatoes. Signiﬁcant interests
were at stake: employment for its members/farmers; work for its employees;
nearby residents suﬀering from stench; return on investments for its credi-
tors; involvement of the local and national government; the natural envi-
ronment. Eventually, Avebe could be saved through installing a special
commission that required the cooperation of every involved party and by
taking some painful decisions. The interests and rights of individual stake-
holders were (partially) sacriﬁced in order to secure the rights of the col-
lective stakeholders (collective good, ‘‘license to produce’’). According to
Kaptein and Wempe, the Avebe case illustrates that corporations have to
recognize that the individual contracts with stakeholders are always
grounded in the framework of a social contract constituting the ultimate
basis of the corporations existence.
4.3. The Corporate Integrity Model
Kaptein and Wempe connect their approach of corporate integrity with the
values of ‘‘sustainability’’ and ‘‘sustainable development’’ (2002: 227ﬀ.). In
view of these values, they distinguish ﬁve behavioral principles for managing
stakeholder relations with integrity: openness, empathy, fairness, solidarity,
and reliability (Kaptein and Wempe, 2002: 237 ﬀ.). These behavioral prin-
ciples, which we will not address in detail here, operate as criteria to assess
the corporations relations and behavior. It is argued that these behavioral
principles will be easier to fulﬁll, if the corporate culture and structure
embody ethical qualities that stimulate employees to engage responsibly
with the three fundamental dilemmas. Table 2 shows that each of these
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qualities – clarity, consistency, achievability, supportability, visibility, dis-
cussability, and sanctionability – relates to the three fundamental dilemmas.
The seven qualities operate as criteria that can be used to evaluate the
corporate culture and structure. For the incorporation of this model,
Kaptein and Wempe propose a set of practical working methods that are
directed at leadership/management with integrity, business codes of integ-
rity, and the implementation and auditing of integrity.
5. CORPORATE INTEGRITY: A REMEDY AGAINST CYNICISM?
The corporate integrity approach of Kaptein and Wempe can be considered
as a valuable and insightful contribution to the question of how to deal with
(dilemmas of) conﬂicting interests, open discussion, fairness, and strategic
decision-making in the context of stakeholder dialog. The three funda-
mental corporate dilemmas (entangled hands, many hands, dirty hands) give
a clear picture of the constraints for moral communication in a business
environment. By building on ethical traditions, management theory, and
(organizational) sociological theory, the theory of corporate integrity oﬀers
a practical perspective on moral communication in a hybrid social context in
which strategic and communicative interactions are inextricably intertwined.
The pitfalls of simple moral judgments and accusations are avoided by
paying thorough attention to the interrelations between normative princi-
ples and organizational ethical qualities. Ethics is placed in a speciﬁc social
context and this makes the (lack of) eﬀorts and intentions of moral agents to
a certain degree (sociologically) understandable. Furthermore, Kaptein and
Wempe show that concentrating on speciﬁc dilemmas within a hybrid
strategic-communicative context seems fruitful for developing and improv-
ing moral debate. This seems more fruitful and realistic than concentrating
on the search for (ideal) domains of free discourse within which all kind of
social requirements have to be met. Nevertheless, some organizational
ethical qualities (discussability, supportability) seem to be imprinted by such
ideal Habermasian requirements of communicative rationality.
The theory of corporate integrity makes plausible that moral commu-
nication in an economic market context, in spite of certain constraints and
dilemmas, is very well possible, but to what extent does it oﬀer a solution for
cynical attitudes and the use of hidden agendas? Although Kaptein and
Wempe do not explicitly talk about the problem of cynicism in modern
societies (they rather speak in terms of (economic) opportunism), the cor-
porate integrity approach oﬀers a practical perspective to deal with (cynical)
obstacles and to fulﬁll corporate social responsibility. Firstly, they tackle
(cynical) amoral or functional views, which do not ascribe any moral
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responsibility to the corporation, by elucidating that also organizations can
be considered as moral entities that bear responsibility as a whole. Secondly,
they suggest solutions for moral window-dressing by giving practical
guidelines to realize corporate ethical qualities that can function as a good
antidote against internal organizational cynicism and hypocrisy, thus chal-
lenging cynical disbelievers that do not see a way out of these diﬃculties.
The ethical qualities that are described for adequately dealing with the
entangled and many hands dilemmas seem to be a good medicine against
cynical behavior on the shop ﬂoor or employees indiﬀerence. These orga-
nizational qualities with respect to corporate integrity can improve moral
communication within the corporation.
However, Kaptein and Wempe tend to make the concept of corporate
integrity an all-purpose remedy for corporate dilemmas. This can be ex-
plained by their deﬁnition of integrity, which, without doubt, has a conso-
nant ring. Integrity was deﬁned with three characteristics: (1) internal
coherence in the motives for what one would like to be and realize, (2)
coherence between motives and (the eﬀects) of actions, and (3) coherence in
motives, actions, and eﬀects with respect to the social environment. The
third characteristic of external integration with the outside world seems to
overstretch the concept of integrity. Integrity would also mean fulﬁlling
social roles and tasks that contribute ‘‘to the smooth functioning of the
whole’’ (Kaptein and Wempe, 2002: 92), and thus becoming integrated into
his or her environment. The question arises of whether a quintessential trait
of integrity is not exactly the opposite, to wit, not integrating with the
outside world but remaining true to what one sincerely beliefs in spite of
external social pressure. Kaptein and Wempe (2002: 92) acknowledge that
‘‘integrity also implies independence and may sometimes even require dis-
obedience and disloyalty,’’ but do not give a clear answer about how this
idea of independence relates to the demand of ﬂexibility and adjustment
with respect to the diﬀerent stakeholder interests. The response that integ-
rity in this context means ‘‘acting in accordance with the legitimate expec-
tations of those around us’’ (Kaptein and Wempe, 2002: 92) only seems to
shift the problem. What are legitimate expectations and who deﬁnes them?
Although Kaptein and Wempe take a hybrid social context as starting
point in their corporate integrity approach and do not feel committed to
Habermass basic distinction between two diﬀerent levels of social integra-
tion (lifeworld versus economic and political subsystems), they do seem to
share with Habermas a consonant view on moral communication and
rationality. Above all things, integrity is coherence. In the end, the devel-
opment of moral communication and integrity should lead to the realization
of ones own authenticity as an ethical agent who is peacefully integrated
with his or her environment. However, taking a more ambivalent view on
ERIK DE BAKKER134
this matter, one could imagine that the tension between ideal and reality
could also lead to inner conﬂicts. For instance, the authentic feeling that one
will always be trapped in a power-propelled world, if one tries to do the
reasonable right thing. Recalling Sloterdijks description of modern cyni-
cism as a tacit and ubiquitous phenomenon, an important cause of dirty
hands dilemmas might be cynical or opportunistic behavior of stakeholders
or other economic rivals. These are dilemmas that might only be solved by
the cynical sacriﬁce of less powerful parties. Perhaps the truth is that a
corporation of great integrity faces unsolvable dirty hands dilemmas exactly
because of its great integrity. One can become painfully aware that in reality
honesty and helplessness are closely connected. Integrity is of great value
but can also lead to scars on the (personal or organizational) soul that do
not feel ‘‘round and sound’’ at all.
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